Abstract

Cooley's argument that persons with pre‐dementia have a Kantian duty to die has led to much debate. Cooley gives two reasons for his claim, the first being that a person with pre‐dementia should end his/her life when he/she will inevitably and irreversibly lose rationality and be unable to live morally as a result. This paper argues that this reason derives from an unsubstantiated premise and general confusion regarding the condition for a Kantian duty to die. Rather, a close reading of Kant reveals that such a condition occurs when a person confronts an external handicap that does not undermine his/her rational ability but deprives him/her of the possibility of living the way a person should. People do not confront this experience with progressive dementia. The other reason Cooley proposes is that a person should not allow their continued existence to become a burden to others. This claim partly stems from a radical interpretation of a case discussed by Kant and is partly based on a misuse of Kant's formulation of humanity. Based on a prudent inference from Kantian ethics, this article argues against Cooley that persons with pre‐dementia have no Kantian duty to die.