Metaphilosophy 44 (5):604-620 (2013)

Authors
Graham Hubbs
University of Idaho
Abstract
This article critiques the much-discussed notion of alief recently introduced by Tamar Gendler. The narrow goal is to show that the notion is explanatorily unnecessary; the broader goal is to demonstrate the importance of making explicit one's explanatory framework when offering a philosophical account of the mind. After introducing the concept of alief and the examples Gendler characterizes in terms of it, the article examines the explanatory framework within which appeal to such a concept can seem necessary. This framework, it argues, is a generalization of the belief-desire account of action. Although Gendler introduces the notion of alief in an attempt to move beyond the belief-desire account, it argues that she nevertheless works within a generalized version of its explanatory structure. Once the framework is made explicit, we find no explanatory need that requires introducing the notion of alief into our account of the mind.
Keywords emotion  desire  appearance  association  moral psychology  alief  explanation  action  belief  mind
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DOI 10.1111/meta.12056
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References found in this work BETA

Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.Wilfrid S. Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:321-332.
Intention.P. L. Heath - 1960 - Philosophical Quarterly 10 (40):281.

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Citations of this work BETA

Self-Deceptive Resistance to Self-Knowledge.Graham Hubbs - 2018 - Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 13 (2):25-47.
Self-Knowledge, Choice Blindness, and Confabulation.Hayley F. Webster - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst

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