Belief and Degrees of Belief

In F. Huber & C. Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer (2009)
Authors
Franz Huber
University of Toronto, St. George
Abstract
Degrees of belief are familiar to all of us. Our confidence in the truth of some propositions is higher than our confidence in the truth of other propositions. We are pretty confident that our computers will boot when we push their power button, but we are much more confident that the sun will rise tomorrow. Degrees of belief formally represent the strength with which we believe the truth of various propositions. The higher an agent’s degree of belief for a particular proposition, the higher her confidence in the truth of that proposition. For instance, Sophia’s degree of belief that it will be sunny in Vienna tomorrow might be .52, whereas her degree of belief that the train will leave on time might be .23. The precise meaning of these statements depends, of course, on the underlying theory of degrees of belief. These theories offer a formal tool to measure degrees of belief, to investigate the relations between various degrees of belief in different propositions, and to normatively evaluate degrees of belief.
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Citations of this work BETA

A New Puzzle About Belief and Credence.Andrew Moon - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-20.
Faith, Belief and Fictionalism.Finlay Malcolm & Michael Scott - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):257-274.
The Metaphysics of Degrees.René van Woudenberg & Rik Peels - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):46-65.
Possiamo dubitare di dubitare?Giovanni Tuzet - 2015 - Epistemologia 2:255-261.

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