Bayesian Confirmation: A Means with No End

Abstract
Any theory of confirmation must answer the following question: what is the purpose of its conception of confirmation for scientific inquiry? In this article, we argue that no Bayesian conception of confirmation can be used for its primary intended purpose, which we take to be making a claim about how worthy of belief various hypotheses are. Then we consider a different use to which Bayesian confirmation might be put, namely, determining the epistemic value of experimental outcomes, and thus to decide which experiments to carry out. Interestingly, Bayesian confirmation theorists rule out that confirmation be used for this purpose. We conclude that Bayesian confirmation is a means with no end. 1 Introduction2 Bayesian Confirmation Theory3 Bayesian Confirmation and Belief4 Confirmation and the Value of Experiments5 Conclusion
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2015
DOI 10.1093/bjps/axu004
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
References found in this work BETA
The Problem of Measure Sensitivity Redux.Peter Brössel - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (3):378-397.
Interpretations of Probability.Alan Hájek - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 13 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
State of the Field: Measuring Information and Confirmation.Vincenzo Crupi & Katya Tentori - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 47:81-90.
Inductive Logic.Vincenzo Crupi - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):641-650.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Confirmation and Induction.Franz Huber - 2007 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
What Is the Point of Confirmation?Franz Huber - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1146-1159.
Subjective Probabilities as Basis for Scientific Reasoning?Franz Huber - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (1):101-116.
The Paradox of Confirmation.Branden Fitelson - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (1):95–113.
Subjective and Objective Confirmation.Patrick Maher - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (2):149-174.
Reply to Crupi Et Al.'S "Bayesian Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence".Franz Huber - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (2):213-215.
Confirmational Holism and Bayesian Epistemology.David Christensen - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (4):540-557.
Studies in Bayesian Confirmation Theory.Branden Fitelson - 2001 - Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison
Added to PP index
2013-07-24

Total downloads
105 ( #49,703 of 2,199,753 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #149,569 of 2,199,753 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature