Children and adults don’t think they are free: A skeptical look at agent causationism

In Advances in Experimental Philosophy. pp. 189-210 (2019)
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Abstract

The present studies offer a detailed look at how different features influence our intuitions about choice under motivational constraints. The data of Study 1 suggest that children might reason conditionally about free will: six-year-olds succeed in consistently answering affirmatively that they could have done otherwise only if at least two conflicting desires are implied, which are compatible with their own desires. We also demonstrate (Study 2) that adults are likely not to conceive of themselves as agent causationists. When participants are questioned about the possibility of having done otherwise (rather than their ability to have done otherwise), they deny, in the main, that any such possibility exists.

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Author Profiles

Kevin Reuter
University of Zürich
Pascale Willemsen
University of Zürich
Alex Wiegmann
Ruhr-Universität Bochum

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