Analysis 59 (4):355–361 (1999)

Authors
Donald Hubin
Ohio State University
Abstract
In 'The Moral Problem', Michael Smith defends a conception of normative reasons that is nonrelative. Given his understanding of normative reasons, nonrelativity commits him to the convergence hypothesis: that, as a result of the process or correction of beliefs and rational deliberation, 'all' agents would converge on having the same set of desires. I develop several reasons for being pessimistic about the truth of this hypothesis. As a result, if normative reasons exist, we have a reason to be skeptical of either Smith's understanding of what normative reasons are or of his insistence that they are nonrelative.
Keywords practical reasons  desires  normative reasons
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/1467-8284.00193
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

An Essay on the Desire-Based Reasons Model.Attila Tanyi - 2006 - Dissertation, Central European University
Reasons, Values, and Rational Actions.Paul K. Moser - 1990 - Journal of Philosophical Research 15:127-151.
On Desires and Practical Reasons.John J. Tilley - 2004 - Acta Analytica 19 (32):5-18.
The Idea of a Normative Reason.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2003 - In P. Schaber & R. Huntelmann (eds.), Grundlagen der Ethik. pp. 41--65.
Reasons and Psychological Causes.Wayne A. Davis - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (1):51 - 101.
Reasons and Motivation.Derek Parfit - 1997 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):99–130.
Desires, Reasons, and Causes. [REVIEW]Stephen Darwall - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):436–443.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
258 ( #29,857 of 2,340,238 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
13 ( #47,390 of 2,340,238 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes