Analytica 1 (1):20-36 (2015)
In this brief note I show how to model conceptual change, logical learning, and revision of one's beliefs in response to conditional information such as indicative conditionals that do not express propositions.
|Keywords||ranking functions probability conceptual change|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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