Law and Philosophy 18 (2):113-139 (1999)

Authors
Donald Hubin
Ohio State University
Karen Haely
Cleveland State University
Abstract
Standards of reasonability play an important role in some of the most difficult cases of rape. In recent years, the notion of the reasonable person has supplanted the historical concept of the reasonable man as the test of reasonability. Contemporary feminist critics like Catharine MacKinnon and Kim Lane Scheppele have challenged the notion of the reasonable person on the grounds that reasonability standards are gendered to the ground and so, in practice, the reasonable person is just the reasonable man in a gender neutral guise. These critics call for the explicit employment of a reasonable woman standard for application to the actions of female victims of rape. But the arguments for abandoning a gender-neutral standard are double-edged and the employment of gendered standards of reasonability is likely to have implications that are neither foreseen by, nor acceptable to, advocates of such standards. Reasonable agent standards can be dropped, in favor of appeals to the notion of a reasonable demand by the law. However, if reasonable agent standards are to be retained, gendered versions of such standards are not preferable to gender-neutral ones
Keywords Law   Logic   Philosophy of Law   Law Theory/Law Philosophy   Political Science   Social Issues
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DOI 10.2307/3505194
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References found in this work BETA

On Liberty.John Stuart Mill - 1956 - Broadview Press.
Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis.Lois Pineau - 1989 - Law and Philosophy 8 (2):217-243.
“The Moral Magic of Consent.Larry Alexander - 1996 - Legal Theory 2 (3):165-174.
Rape and Persuasive Definition.Keith Burgess-Jackson - 1995 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):415 - 454.

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Citations of this work BETA

Feminist Perspectives on Rape.Rebecca Whisnant - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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