British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (2):213-215 (2008)
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Abstract |
Crupi et al. propose a generalization of Bayesian confirmation theory that they claim to adequately deal with confirmation by uncertain evidence. Consider a series of points of time t0, . . . , ti, . . . , tn such that the agent’s subjective probability for an atomic proposition E changes from Pr0 at t0 to . . . to Pri at ti to . . . to Prn at tn. It is understood that the agent’s subjective probabilities change for E and no logically stronger proposition, and that the agent updates her subjective probabilities by Jeffrey conditionalization. For this specific scenario the authors propose to take the difference between Pr0 and Pri as the degree to which E confirms H for the agent at time ti , C0,i. This proposal is claimed to be adequate, because.
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Keywords | bayesian confirmation |
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DOI | 10.1093/bjps/axn002 |
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References found in this work BETA
Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory.John Earman - 1992 - MIT Press.
Subjective Probabilities as Basis for Scientific Reasoning?Franz Huber - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (1):101-116.
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