Subjective Probabilities as Basis for Scientific Reasoning?


Authors
Franz Huber
University of Toronto, St. George
Abstract
Bayesianism is the position that scientific reasoning is probabilistic and that probabilities are adequately interpreted as an agent's actual subjective degrees of belief, measured by her betting behaviour. Confirmation is one important aspect of scientific reasoning. The thesis of this paper is the following: if scientific reasoning is at all probabilistic, the subjective interpretation has to be given up in order to get right confirmation—and thus scientific reasoning in general. The Bayesian approach to scientific reasoning Bayesian confirmation theory The example The less reliable the source of information, the higher the degree of Bayesian confirmation Measure sensitivity A more general version of the problem of old evidence Conditioning on the entailment relation The counterfactual strategy Generalizing the counterfactual strategy The desired result, and a necessary and sufficient condition for it Actual degrees of belief The common knock-down feature, or ‘anything goes’ The problem of prior probabilities.
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Reprint years 2005
DOI 10.1093/phisci/axi105
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References found in this work BETA

Studies in Bayesian Confirmation Theory.Branden Fitelson - 2001 - Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison
Bayes or Bust.John Earman - 1992 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (3):399-424.
Measuring Confirmation.David Christensen - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (9):437-461.
Measuring Confirmation.David Christensen - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (9):437.

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Citations of this work BETA

Bayesian Confirmation: A Means with No End.Peter Brössel & Franz Huber - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (4):737-749.
Reply to Crupi Et Al.'s ‘Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence’.Franz Huber - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (2):213-215.
Confirmation and Induction.Franz Huber - 2007 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Bayesian Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence: A Reply to Huber [2005].Vincenzo Crupi, Roberto Festa & Tommaso Mastropasqua - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (2):201 - 211.

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