Towards Ideal Understanding

Ergo:1-34 (2022)
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What does it take to understand a phenomenon ideally, or to the highest conceivable extent? In this paper, we answer this question by arguing for five necessary conditions for ideal understanding: (i) representational accuracy, (ii) intelligibility, (iii) truth, (iv) reasonable endorsement, and (v) fitting. Even if one disagrees that there is some form of ideal understanding, these five conditions can be regarded as sufficient conditions for a particularly deep level of understanding. We then argue that grasping, novel predictions, and transparency are not reasonable conditions for ideal understanding.

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Author Profiles

Federica Isabella Malfatti
University of Innsbruck
Mario Hubert
American University in Cairo

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References found in this work

Saving the phenomena.James Bogen & James Woodward - 1988 - Philosophical Review 97 (3):303-352.
Studies in the Logic of Explanation.Carl Hempel & Paul Oppenheim - 1948 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 14 (2):133-133.
True enough.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):113–131.

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