Why follow the royal rule?

Synthese 194 (5) (2017)

Authors
Franz Huber
University of Toronto, St. George
Abstract
This note is a sequel to Huber. It is shown that obeying a normative principle relating counterfactual conditionals and conditional beliefs, viz. the royal rule, is a necessary and sufficient means to attaining a cognitive end that relates true beliefs in purely factual, non-modal propositions and true beliefs in purely modal propositions. Along the way I will sketch my idealism about alethic or metaphysical modality.
Keywords Counterfactuals  Conditional belief  Modal idealism  Ranking functions  Royal rule  Tracking
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Reprint years 2017
DOI 10.1007/s11229-015-1004-x
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References found in this work BETA

Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Blackwell.
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
Humean Supervenience Debugged.David K. Lewis - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):473--490.

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Citations of this work BETA

Ranking Theory.Franz Huber - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 397-436.

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