Naughty beliefs

Philosophical Studies 160 (2):209-222 (2012)
Can a person ever occurrently believe p and yet have the simultaneous, occurrent belief q that this very belief that p is false? Surely not, most would say: that description of a person’s epistemic economy seems to misunderstand the very concept of belief. In this paper I question this orthodox assumption. There are, I suggest, cases where we have a first-order mental state m that involves taking the world to be a certain way, yet although we ourselves acknowledge that we are in m, we reflectively disavow m’s propositional content. If such an epistemic stance is possible, does this irrationally persistent first-order state m really deserve the title of belief, or should it instead be classified under some other, less doxastic appellation? I argue in this paper that the belief terminology is warranted, and thus, that we can be correctly described as having the second-order belief that a specific first-order belief that we nonetheless continue to hold is false. In such cases, our first-order state is what I refer to as a naughty belief. Like naughty toddlers, naughty beliefs are recalcitrant in the face of epistemic authority.
Keywords Belief  Epistemology  Philosophy of mind  Moore’s paradox
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9714-5
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References found in this work BETA
Tamar Szabó Gendler (2008). Alief and Belief. Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.
G. E. M. Anscombe (1957). Intention. Harvard University Press.
Alex Byrne (2005). Introspection. Philosophical Topics 33 (1):79-104.

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Citations of this work BETA
Eric Mandelbaum (2013). Against Alief. Philosophical Studies 165 (1):197-211.
Maura Tumulty (2014). Managing Mismatch Between Belief and Behavior. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (3):261-292.

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