Acta Analytica 21 (3):85-92 (2006)
In this paper, I raise some questions about Pritchard ’s internalist argument for scepticism. I argue that his internalism begs the question in support of scepticism. Correlatively I advance what I take to be a better internalist argument for scepticism, one that leaves open the possibility of empirically adjudicating sceptical hypotheses. I close by discussing what it means to be an internalist
|Keywords||Duncan Pritchard scepticism internalism epistemology brain-in-a-vat|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Scepticism, Epistemic Luck, and Epistemic Angst.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):185 – 205.
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