The role of trust in judgment


In this dissertation I defend five claims about trust: 1) trusting and trustworthiness are conceptually but not causally connected; 2) trust is risky; 3) trust requires good will; 4) trust is a two-part relation; and 5) trust is an interpretative framework. A concern for trust often appears in discussions about testimony and the expectation of truthfulness; Bentley Glass, John Hardwig, and Jonathan Adler each address the role of trust in science while assuming a necessary connection between trusting and trustworthiness. I argue that this conception is untenable because a justification for one fails to suffice as a justification of the other. I show, instead, that it is our assessment that links trustworthiness to trusting. My second claim, that trust involves risk, is contentious. I argue that the common understanding of risk as harm, which is held by Russell Hardin, contains the more technical understanding of risk as uncertainty, which is suggested by Niklas Luhman. Trust is risky precisely because it is inherently uncertain. Annette Baier argues that failing to recognize a distinction between trusting and action associated with that trust leads us to accept accounts of trust that are too broad. I argue that trust is to believe that another is concerned with your well-being, has good will, because she is concerned about you and not that it will necessarily benefit her in some way. Seeing trust as good will allows me to advance my fourth claim, that trust is a two-part relation, because trust is the assessment of another's good will towards me. Trusting another is believing that the other's good judgment will include concern and consideration for my interests because they are my interests. My fifth point follows naturally once trust is understood to be a risky, two-part relation requiring good will: it is an interpretive framework. Our trust in another sets the tone for understanding her behavior such that we take her actions as either supporting or blocking our interests. This account takes the capacity to trust to be the foundation for, rather than merely an outgrowth of, our judgments.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 89,446

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

Creating Trust.Robert C. Solomon - 1998 - Business Ethics Quarterly 8 (2):205-232.
Trust and the trickster problem.Zac Cogley - 2012 - Analytic Philosophy 53 (1):30-47.
Trust: self-interest and the common good.Marek Kohn - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Trust of people, words, and God: a route for philosophy of religion.Joseph John Godfrey - 2012 - Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.
Trust and Trustworthiness.Stephen Wright - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (3):615-627.
On the emotional character of trust.Bernd Lahno - 2001 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2):171-189.
Deciding to trust, coming to believe.Richard Holton - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):63 – 76.
The Case of Online Trust.Matteo Turilli, Mariarosaria Taddeo & Antonino Vaccaro - 2010 - Knowledge, Technology & Policy 23 (3-4):333-345.
Trust in Strangers, Trust in Friends.Jessica Miller - 2003 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 10 (1):17-22.
Puzzles about Trust.Doran Smolkin - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):431-449.


Added to PP

9 (#1,066,601)

6 months
1 (#1,005,371)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Controlling attitudes.Pamela Hieronymi - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):45-74.
Trust as an affective attitude.Karen Jones - 1996 - Ethics 107 (1):4-25.
Deciding to trust, coming to believe.Richard Holton - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):63 – 76.
The reasons of trust.Pamela Hieronymi - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):213 – 236.
The Cunning of Trust.Philip Pettit - 1995 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 24 (3):202-225.

View all 91 references / Add more references