Banishing “I” and “we” from accounts of metacognition

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):148-149 (2009)

Authors
Bryce Huebner
Georgetown University
Daniel C. Dennett
Tufts University
Abstract
Carruthers offers a promising model for how know the propositional contents of own minds. Unfortunately, in retaining talk of first-person access to mental states, his suggestions assume that a higher-order self is already We invite Carruthers to eliminate the first-person from his model and to develop a more thoroughly third-person model of metacognition
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X09000661
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References found in this work BETA

Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - MIT Press.
The Phenomenal Stance.Philip Robbins & Anthony I. Jack - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):59-85.
How Language Helps Us Think.Ray S. Jackendoff - 1996 - Pragmatics and Cognition 4 (1):1-34.

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Genuinely Collective Emotions.Bryce Huebner - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (1):89-118.
Does Naturalism Rest on a Mistake.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2011 - American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (2):161-173.

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