Elusive Freedom? A Reply to Helen Beebee

Philosophical Review 113 (3):411-416 (2004)

Michael Huemer
University of Colorado, Boulder
In “Van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument”, I offered a reformulation and defense of the Consequence Argument for incompatibilism, including a response to Lewis-style compatibilism. In a recent response, Helen Beebee defends Lewisian compatibilism against my argument. In the following, I will show why Beebee’s defense does not succeed.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0031-8108
DOI phr2004113320
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 41,481
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Elusive Freedom? A Reply to Helen Beebee.Michael Huemer - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (3):411-416.
Reply to Huemer on the Consequence Argument.Helen Beebee - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):235-241.
Defending Lewis’s Local Miracle Compatibilism.Shane Oakley - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (2):337-349.
Free Will Sans Metaphysics?Helen Beebee - 2012 - Metascience 21 (1):77-81.
Non-Paradoxical Multi-Location.Helen Beebee & Michael Rush - 2003 - Analysis 63 (4):311-317.
Metametaphysics.Helen Beebee - 2010 - The Philosophers' Magazine 50:24-25.
Causing and Nothingness.Helen Beebee - 2004 - In L. A. Paul, E. J. Hall & J. Collins (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press. pp. 291--308.
Radical Indeterminism and Top-Down Causation.Helen Beebee - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (3):537-545.
Do Causes Raise the Chances of Effects?Helen Beebee - 1998 - Analysis 58 (3):182-190.


Added to PP index

Total views
6 ( #918,594 of 2,248,507 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #311,260 of 2,248,507 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes

Sign in to use this feature