Naturalism and the Problem of Moral Knowledge

Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):575-597 (2000)
Abstract
Ethical naturalists interpret moral knowledge as analogous to scientific knowledge and not dependent on intuition. For their account to succeed, moral truths must explain observable phenomena, and these explanations (i) must be better than any explanations framed in non-moral terms, (ii) must not rely on ad hoc posits about the causal powers of moral properties, and (iii) must not presuppose the existence of an independent means of awareness of moral truths. No moral explanations satisfy these criteria.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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ISBN(s) 0038-4283
DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2000.tb00916.x
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Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.
The Language of Morals.R. M. Hare - 1952 - Oxford Clarendon Press.
Principia Ethica.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Dover Publications.
Moral Realism.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (2):163-207.

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