Epistemicism, paradox, and conditional obligation

Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2123-2139 (2015)

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Abstract
Stewart Shapiro has objected to the epistemicist theory of vagueness on grounds that it gives counterintuitive predictions about cases involving conditional obligation. This paper details a response on the epistemicist’s behalf. I first argue that Shapiro’s own presentation of the objection is unsuccessful as an argument against epistemicism. I then reconstruct and offer two alternative arguments inspired by Shapiro’s considerations, and argue that these fail too, given the information-sensitive nature of conditional obligations
Keywords Vagueness  Epistemicism  Conditional obligation  Free choice permission  Miners Paradox
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-014-0401-1
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - Routledge.
Ifs and Oughts.Niko Kolodny & John MacFarlane - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (3):115-143.
Vagueness and Contradiction.Roy Sorensen - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
Vagueness in Context. [REVIEW]Stewart Shapiro - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):471-483.

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Citations of this work BETA

An Acquittal for Epistemicism.Hesam Mohamadi - 2018 - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 31 (4):905-928.

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