Phenomenal Conservatism

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2013)
Authors
Michael Huemer
University of Colorado, Boulder
Abstract
Phenomenal Conservatism Phenomenal Conservatism is a theory in epistemology that seeks, roughly, to ground justified beliefs in the way things “appear” or “seem” to the subject who holds a belief. The theory fits with an internalistic form of foundationalism—that is, the view that some beliefs are justified non-inferentially (not on the basis of other beliefs), and that […]
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