Phenomenal conservatism and self-defeat: a reply to DePoe

Philosophical Studies 156 (1):1-13 (2011)

Abstract

John DePoe has criticized the self-defeat argument for Phenomenal Conservatism. He argues that acquaintance, rather than appearance, may form the basis for non-inferentially justified beliefs, and that Phenomenal Conservatism conflicts with a central motivation for internalism. I explain how Phenomenal Conservatism and the self-defeat argument may survive these challenges.

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Michael Huemer
University of Colorado, Boulder

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