Philosophical Studies 156 (1):1-13 (2011)
AbstractJohn DePoe has criticized the self-defeat argument for Phenomenal Conservatism. He argues that acquaintance, rather than appearance, may form the basis for non-inferentially justified beliefs, and that Phenomenal Conservatism conflicts with a central motivation for internalism. I explain how Phenomenal Conservatism and the self-defeat argument may survive these challenges.
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References found in this work
The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.
Matter and Consciousness: A Contemporary Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind.Paul M. Churchland (ed.) - 1984 - MIT Press.
Citations of this work
Seemings and Justification: An Introduction.Chris Tucker - 2013 - In Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-29.
Phenomenal Conservatism and the Subject’s Perspective Objection.Logan Paul Gage - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (1):43-58.
Inferential Seemings and the Problem of Reflective Awareness.Luca Moretti - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):253-271.
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