Serious theories and skeptical theories: Why you are probably not a brain in a vat
Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1031-1052 (2016)
Abstract
Skeptical hypotheses such as the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis provide extremely poor explanations for our sensory experiences. Because these scenarios accommodate virtually any possible set of evidence, the probability of any given set of evidence on the skeptical scenario is near zero; hence, on Bayesian grounds, the scenario is not well supported by the evidence. By contrast, serious theories make reasonably specific predictions about the evidence and are then well supported when these predictions are satisfiedAuthor's Profile
DOI
10.1007/s11098-015-0539-5
My notes
Similar books and articles
The regress argument against Cartesian skepticism.Jessica M. Wilson - 2012 - Analysis 72 (4):668-673.
Skeptical Theism, Moral Skepticism, and Divine Commands.Brian Ribeiro & Scott Aikin - 2013 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (2):77-96.
Externalism, Skepticism, and Relevant Alternatives.Raymond Jerome Vanarragon - 2002 - Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
All too skeptical theism.William Hasker - 2010 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 68 (1-3):15-29.
Skeptical theism is incompatible with theodicy.Scott Coley - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (1):53-63.
Live Skeptical Hypotheses.Bryan Frances - 2008 - In John Greco (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press. pp. 225-245.
Skeptical Hypotheses and Moral Skepticism.Joshua May - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):341-359.
Skeptical Theism, Moral Skepticism, and Divine Deception.Joshua Seigal - 2010 - Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 15 (2):251-274.
Analytics
Added to PP
2015-08-22
Downloads
2,071 (#2,466)
6 months
180 (#3,178)
2015-08-22
Downloads
2,071 (#2,466)
6 months
180 (#3,178)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
The nomological argument for the existence of God.Tyler Hildebrand & Thomas Metcalf - 2022 - Noûs 56 (2):443-472.
Philosophers should prefer simpler theories.Darren Bradley - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3049-3067.
Carnap’s epistemological critique of metaphysics.Darren Bradley - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):2247-2265.
Two New Doubts about Simulation Arguments.Micah Summers & Marcus Arvan - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (3):496-508.
References found in this work
Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago, IL, USA: Chicago University of Chicago Press.
The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.