The problem of defeasible justification

Erkenntnis 54 (3):375-397 (2001)
The problem of induction and the problem of Cartesian/brain-in-the-vat skepticism have much in common. Both are instances of a general problem of defeasible justification . I use the term "defeasible justification" to refer to a relation between a piece of evidence.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Ethics   Logic   Ontology
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DOI 10.1023/A:1010718330593
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Jonathan Vogel (2004). Skeptical Arguments. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):426–455.

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