Van Inwagen's consequence argument

Philosophical Review 109 (4):525-544 (2000)
Abstract
Peter van Inwagen ’s argument for incompatibilism uses a sentential operator, “N”, which can be read as “No one has any choice about the fact that....” I show that, given van Inwagen ’s understanding of the notion of having a choice, the argument is invalid. However, a different interpretation of “N” can be given, such that the argument is clearly valid, the premises remain highly plausible, and the conclusion implies that free will is incompatible with determinism
Keywords Consequence  Determinism  Free Will  Incompatibility  Metaphysics  Possible World  Van Inwagen, P
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DOI 10.1215/00318108-109-4-525
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Citations of this work BETA
Free Will Agnosticism.Stephen Kearns - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):235-252.
Incompatibilism and the Past.Andrew M. Bailey - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):351-376.
Incompatibilism Proved.Alexander R. Pruss - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (4):430-437.
Against the Mind Argument.Peter A. Graham - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (2):273-294.
Molinists Cannot Endorse the Consequence Argument.Yishai Cohen - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (3):231-246.

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Similar books and articles
Van Inwagen on Free Will.John Martin Fischer - 1986 - Philosophical Quarterly 36 (April):252-260.
The Consequence Argument.Peter van Inwagen - 2008 - In Peter Van Inwagen & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Metaphysics: The Big Questions. Blackwell.
The Core of the Consequence Argument.Alex Blum - 2003 - Dialectica 57 (4):423-429.
Van Inwagen on Free Will.Peter van Inwagen - 2004 - In Joseph K. Campbell (ed.), Freedom and Determinism. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
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