Philosophical Review 109 (4):525-544 (2000)

Michael Huemer
University of Colorado, Boulder
Peter van Inwagen ’s argument for incompatibilism uses a sentential operator, “N”, which can be read as “No one has any choice about the fact that....” I show that, given van Inwagen ’s understanding of the notion of having a choice, the argument is invalid. However, a different interpretation of “N” can be given, such that the argument is clearly valid, the premises remain highly plausible, and the conclusion implies that free will is incompatible with determinism
Keywords Consequence  Determinism  Free Will  Incompatibility  Metaphysics  Possible World  Van Inwagen, P
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DOI 10.1215/00318108-109-4-525
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References found in this work BETA

When is the Will Free?Peter van Inwagen - 1989 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:399 - 422.
Are We Free to Break the Laws?David Lewis - 1981 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will. Oxford University Press.
Selective Necessity and the Free Will Problem.Michael Slote - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (January):5-24.
Reply to Narveson.Peter Van Inwagen - 1977 - Philosophical Studies 32 (1):89-98.

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Citations of this work BETA

Able to Do the Impossible.Jack Spencer - 2017 - Mind 126 (502):466-497.
Implicit Attitudes and the Ability Argument.Wesley Buckwalter - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (11):2961-2990.
Incompatibilism and the Past.Andrew M. Bailey - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):351-376.
Free Will Agnosticism.Stephen Kearns - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):235-252.
Incompatibilism Proved.Alexander R. Pruss - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (4):430-437.

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Similar books and articles

Van Inwagen on Free Will.John Martin Fischer - 1986 - Philosophical Quarterly 36 (April):252-260.
The Consequence Argument.Peter van Inwagen - 2008 - In Peter Van Inwagen & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Metaphysics: The Big Questions. Blackwell.
The Core of the Consequence Argument.Alex Blum - 2003 - Dialectica 57 (4):423-429.
Van Inwagen on Free Will.Peter van Inwagen - 2004 - In Joseph K. Campbell (ed.), Freedom and Determinism. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.


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