Free Will for the Long Run

The Monist 104 (3):352-365 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

For beings that have a beginning in time, free will seems impossible, because our choices seem to be a result of past events over which we had no control. Latter-day Saint theology offers what seems a simple solution: the idea that human beings have always existed in the form of spirits or “intelligences.” While this idea solves some key puzzles, contemplating an infinite past also brings the recognition that causal autonomy is not enough for freedom. A crucial feature of humanity is the ability to move beyond past choices and versions of ourselves. Human freedom involves a dynamic process of identification, alienation, and re-identification through which we develop, improve, and mature as agents. Thinking about freedom over the long run, with attention to both the past and the future, casts the traditional debate over free will in a distinctive light, suggesting fresh possibilities.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

On the Inevitability of Freedom from a Compatibilist Point of View.Galen Strawson - 1986 - American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (4):393-400.
Freedom, Coherence, and the Self.Laura Waddell Ekstrom - 1993 - Dissertation, The University of Arizona
Freedom, Fatalism, and Foreknowledge.John Martin Fischer & Patrick Todd (eds.) - 2015 - Oxford New York: Oxford University Press.
Time Travelers Are Not Free.Michael C. Rea - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (5):266-279.
Freedom for Letting-Become.Sanja Dejanovic - 2015 - Idealistic Studies 45 (2):191-213.
Free Will and Education.Johannes Giesinger - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 44 (4):515-528.
The Freedom of God.Scout Powell - 2020 - Quaerens Deum: The Liberty Undergraduate Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (1).
Freedom and Criticism: An Account of Free Action.Paul H. Benson - 1984 - Dissertation, Princeton University

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-06-19

Downloads
18 (#814,090)

6 months
3 (#1,002,413)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Benjamin Huff
Randolph-Macon College

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry Frankfurt - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press UK.
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry Frankfurt - 1971 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will. Oxford University Press.

View all 10 references / Add more references