Dilemmic Epistemology

Synthese 196 (10):4059-4090 (2019)
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Abstract

This article argues that there can be epistemic dilemmas: situations in which one faces conflicting epistemic requirements with the result that whatever one does, one is doomed to do wrong from the epistemic point of view. Accepting this view, I argue, may enable us to solve several epistemological puzzles.

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Nick Hughes
University of Oslo

Citations of this work

Epistemic Dilemmas: A Guide.Nick Hughes - forthcoming - In Essays on Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Epistemology without guidance.Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):163-196.
Norms of Inquiry.Eliran Haziza - 2023 - Philosophy Compass 18 (12):e12952.
Higher-Order Evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2021 - Analysis 80 (4):789-807.
Epistemic feedback loops (or: how not to get evidence).Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (2):368-393.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Justification and the Truth-Connection.Clayton Littlejohn - 2012 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.

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