Why is our knowledge of the past so much more ‘expansive’ (to pick a suitably vague term) than our knowledge of the future, and what is the best way to capture the difference(s) (i.e., in what sense is knowledge of the past more ‘expansive’)? One could reasonably approach these questions by giving necessary conditions for different kinds of knowledge, and showing how some were satisfied by certain propositions about the past, and not by corresponding propositions about the future. I take it that such is the approach of Chapter 6 of Time and Chance (T&C). Here’s another such a proposal, similar to that of, but significantly different from T&C; my purpose in this section is to highlight the differences, by showing how this account fails.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Skepticism, Contextualism, and Discrimination.Jonathan Schaffer - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):138 - 155.
Knowledge and Objective Chance.John Hawthorne & Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2009 - In Patrick Greenough & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 92--108.
Memory, Expression, and Past-Tense Self-Knowledge.William Child - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):54–76.
Epistemological Time Asymmetry.Steven F. Savitt - 1990 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:317 - 324.
Reason and the Past: The Role of Rationality in Diachronic Self-Knowledge.Krista Lawlor - 2004 - Synthese 145 (3):467-495.
Added to index2009-05-28
Total downloads53 ( #96,296 of 2,154,092 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #224,989 of 2,154,092 )
How can I increase my downloads?