Epistemic Dilemmas: A Guide

In Essays on Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
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Abstract

This is an opinionated guide to the literature on epistemic dilemmas. It discusses seven kinds of situations where epistemic dilemmas appear to arise; dilemmic, dilemmish, and non-dilemmic takes on them; and objections to dilemmic views along with dilemmist’s replies to them

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edition Hughes, Nick (2021) "Epistemic Dilemmas Defended". In Hughes, Nick, Epistemic Dilemmas, pp. : Oxford University Press (2021)

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Dividing Away Doxastic Dilemmas.Clayton Littlejohn - 2021 - In Nick Hughes (ed.), Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.
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Nick Hughes
University of Oslo

Citations of this work

Epistemic feedback loops (or: how not to get evidence).Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (2):368-393.
Non‐ideal epistemic rationality.Nick Hughes - 2024 - Philosophical Issues 34 (1):72-95.
Non‐ideal epistemic rationality.Nick Hughes - 2024 - Philosophical Issues 34 (1):72-95.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.
On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Utilitarianism.J. S. Mill - 1861 - Oxford University Press UK. Edited by Roger Crisp.
Doxastic Wronging.Rima Basu & Mark Schroeder - 2018 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 181-205.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.

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