Philosophical Studies 179 (1):163-196 (2021)

Authors
Nick Hughes
Oxford University
Abstract
Epistemologists often appeal to the idea that a normative theory must provide useful, usable, guidance to argue for one normative epistemology over another. I argue that this is a mistake. Guidance considerations have no role to play in theory choice in epistemology. I show how this has implications for debates about the possibility and scope of epistemic dilemmas, the legitimacy of idealisation in Bayesian epistemology, uniqueness versus permissivism, sharp versus mushy credences, and internalism versus externalism.
Keywords action-guidance  epistemic dilemmas  epistemic ought-implies-can  norms of belief  Bayesian Epistemology  Probabilism  Imprecise credences  Non-ideal rationality  Uniqueness  Permissivism
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-021-01655-8
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin Ira Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.
Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
The Epistemic Role of Consciousness.Declan Smithies (ed.) - 2019 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.

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Citations of this work BETA

Epistemic Feedback Loops (Or: How Not to Get Evidence).Nick Hughes - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Who's Afraid Of Epistemic Dilemmas?Nick Hughes - forthcoming - In Scott Stapleford, Mathias Steup & Kevin McCain (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles.
Gnostic Disagreement Norms.Domingos Faria - 2022 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 18 (1):(A2)5-22.
Gnostic Disagreement NormsGnostičke Norme Neslaganja.Domingos Faria - 2022 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 18 (1):(A1)5-22.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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