Episteme 11 (4):457-462 (2014)

Authors
Nick Hughes
Oxford University
Abstract
Hyman (1999, 2006) argues that knowledge is best conceived as a kind of ability: S knows that p iff S can φ for the reason that p. Hyman motivates this thesis by appealing to Gettier cases. I argue that it is counterexampled by a certain kind of Gettier case where the fact that p is a cause of the subject’s belief that p. One can φ for the reason that p even if one does not know that p. So knowledge is not best conceived as an ability of this kind
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DOI 10.1017/epi.2014.16
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References found in this work BETA

Elusive Knowledge.David K. Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge.Alvin Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.
Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
The Inescapability of Gettier Problems.Linda Zagzebski - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):65-73.

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Citations of this work BETA

Epistemology without guidance.Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):163-196.
Fake Barns and False Dilemmas.Clayton Littlejohn - 2014 - Episteme 11 (4):369-389.
Reasons and Factive Emotions.Christina Dietz - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1681-1691.
How and Why Knowledge is First.Clayton Littlejohn - 2017 - In A. Carter, E. Gordon & B. Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First. Oxford University Press. pp. 19-45.
Knowledgeably Responding to Reasons.Joseph Cunningham - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (3):673-692.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

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