Analysis 39 (3):129-132 (1979)
We give a semantical account of propositional identity which is stronger than mutual entailment. That is, according to our account: (1) if A = B is true in a model, so are A 'validates' B and B 'validates' A. (2) There exist models m such that A 'validates' B and B 'validates' A are true in m but A = B is not true in m. According to our account the following rule is sound: (3) from (.. A..) = (.. B..) infer A = B. The paper is a response to a paper by James Freeman to an earlier paper by us.
|Keywords||James Freeman propositional identity mutual entailment|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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