Problems for contrastive closure: resolved and regained

Philosophical Studies 163 (3):577-590 (2013)
Abstract
The standard contextualist solution to the skeptical paradox is intended to provide a way to retain epistemic closure while avoiding the excessive modesty of radical skepticism and the immodesty of Moorean dogmatism. However, contextualism’s opponents charge that its solution suffers from epistemic immodesty comparable to Moorean dogmatism. According to the standard contextualist solution, all contexts where an agent knows some ordinary proposition to be true are contexts where she also knows that the skeptical hypotheses are false. It has been hoped that contrastivist theories of knowledge can mirror the contextualist solution while avoiding this epistemic immodesty. I review the main problems for contrastive closure and argue that none of the arguments currently in the literature pose an insurmountable problem for the contrastivist solution. However, I argue that contrastivist theories of knowledge, like their contextualist rivals, are indeed committed to epistemic immodesty
Keywords Epistemic closure  Contrastivism  Skeptical paradox  Contextualism
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9832-0
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References found in this work BETA
From Contextualism to Contrastivism.Jonathan Schaffer - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):73-104.
A Contrastivist Manifesto.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - Social Epistemology 22 (3):257 – 270.
A Problem for Contrastivist Accounts of Knowledge.Christoph Kelp - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):287-92.
Contrastivism in Epistemology.Martijn Blaauw - 2008 - Social Epistemology 22 (3):227 – 234.
Contrastivism and Closure.Jonathan Kvanvig - 2008 - Social Epistemology 22 (3):247 – 256.

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