Prior’s Theory of Propositions
Analysis 37 (3):104-112 (1977)
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| Abstract |
Prior propounded a theory that, if correct, explains how it is possible for a statement about propositions to be true even if there are no propositions. The major feature of his theory is his treatment of sentence letters as bindable variables in non-referential positions. His theory, however, does not include a semantical account of the resulting quantification. The paper tries to fill that gap.
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| Keywords | Prior propositions |
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| DOI | 10.1093/analys/37.3.104 |
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