Quine’s Way Out

Analysis 36 (1):28-37 (1975)
Abstract
As a way of dealing with the semantical paradoxes Quine has suggested: that semantical expressions such as ‘true’ and ‘true of’ be used with numerical subscripts; that when a truth locution T is applied to a sentence S, the subscript on T is greater than any within S; otherwise, the result of applying T to S is ill formed. A problem is that this introduces infinitely many semantical primitives. The paper suggests a way around the problem. The paper raises a further problem, leaving it open whether this further problem has a satisfactory solution.
Keywords Quine  semantical paradoxes  semantical primitives
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DOI 10.1093/analys/36.1.28
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