Philosophical Studies 70 (1):35 - 58 (1993)
In this paper the authors recapitulate, justify, and defend against criticism the extension of the redundancy theory of truth to cover a wide range of uses of ‘true’ and ‘false’. In this they are guided by the work of A. N. Prior. They argue Prior was right about the scope and limits of the redundancy theory and that the line he drew between those uses of ‘true’ which are and are not susceptible to treatment via redundancy serves to distinguish two important and mutually irreducible types of truth: redundancy truth and predicative truth. Only the latter serves for semantic theorizing.
|Keywords||Prior redundancy theory of truth|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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