Philosophia 22 (3-4):331-339 (1993)

Authors
Charles Sayward
University of Nebraska, Lincoln
Abstract
It is argued that if there are truth-value gaps then the disquotational theory of truth is false. Secondly, it is argued that the same conclusion can be reached even without the assumption that there are truth-value gaps.
Keywords Quine  truth-value gaps  disquotational theory of truth
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DOI 10.1007/BF02379651
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