The regularity account of relational spacetime

Mind 115 (457):41--73 (2006)
A version of relationism that takes spatiotemporal structures—spatial geometry and a standard of inertia—to supervene on the history of relations between bodies is described and defended. The account is used to explain how the relationist should construe models of Newtonian mechanics in which absolute acceleration manifestly does not supervene on the relations; Ptolemaic and Copernican models for example. The account introduces a new way in which a Lewis-style ‘best system’ might capture regularities in a broadly Humean world; a defence is given against a charge of indeterminism that applies to any such approach to laws.
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzl041
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Erik Curiel (forthcoming). On the Existence of Spacetime Structure. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axw014.
B. Skow (2007). Sklar's Maneuver. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (4):777-786.
Cian Dorr (2010). Of Numbers and Electrons. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2pt2):133-181.

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