Uniqueness, Rationality, and the Norm of Belief

Erkenntnis 84 (1):57-75 (2019)

Authors
Nick Hughes
Oxford University
Abstract
I argue that it is epistemically permissible to believe that P when it is epistemically rational to believe that P. Unlike previous defenses of this claim, this argument is not vulnerable to the claim that permissibility is being confused with excusability.
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-017-9947-6
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References found in this work BETA

Doxastic Deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.
Norms of Assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Assertion, Knowledge, and Context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.

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Citations of this work BETA

Dilemmic Epistemology.Nick Hughes - forthcoming - Synthese.

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