Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 28 (4):409-25 (1995)
This paper is a discussion of Frege's maxim that it is only in the context of a sentence that a word has a meaning. Quine reads the maxim as saying that the sentence is the fundamental unit of significance. Dummett rejects this as a truism. But it is not a truism since it stands in opposition to a conception of meaning held by John Locke and others. The maxim denies that a word has a sense independently of any sentence in which it occurs. Dummett says this denial is inconsistent with the fact that people understand sentences they have never heard before. The maxim is defended against this attack.
|Keywords||Locke Dummett Frege's maxim Quine|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
I. Interpreting Frege: A Reply to Michael Dummett.Gregory Currie - 1983 - Inquiry 26 (3):345 – 359.
Dummett's Forward Road to Frege and to Intuitionism.Jan Dejnožka - 2010 - Diametros 25:118-131.
Frege and the Analysis of Thoughts.Pieranna Garavaso - 1991 - History and Philosophy of Logic 12 (2):195-210.
Null Sentences.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1999 - Iyyun, The Jewish Philosophical Quarterly 48:23-36.
Why Frege Thought It to Be "Probable" That Truth is Indefinable.Markus Stepanians - 2003 - Manuscrito 26 (2):331-345.
Added to index2011-01-24
Total downloads139 ( #32,869 of 2,152,503 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #185,045 of 2,152,503 )
How can I increase my downloads?