Biology and Philosophy 7 (2):229-236 (1992)

In his critical notice, Rosenberg (1991) raises three objections to my evolutionary account of science: whether it is more than a week metaphor, the compatibility of my past objections to reduction and my current advocacy of viewing selection in terms of replication and interaction, and finally, the feasibility of identifying appropriate replicators and interactors in biological evolution, let alone conceptual evolution. I discuss each of these objections in turn.
Keywords Evolutionary epistemology  nature of science  reduction
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DOI 10.1007/BF00129887
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References found in this work BETA

Animal Species and Evolution.Ernst Mayr - 1963 - Belknap of Harvard University Press.
The Structure of Science.Ernest Nagel - 1961 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):275-275.
The Structure of Biological Science.Alexander Rosenberg - 1985 - Cambridge University Press.

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Are Synthetic Genomes Parts of a Genetic Lineage?Gunnar Babcock - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:000-000.

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