Mind 114 (455):689-693 (2005)

Gerald Hull
State University of New York at Binghamton
Varzi has recently joined a thread of arguments originating in an attempt by Sorensen (1985) to demonstrate that the predicate ‘vague’ is itself vague. Sorensen's conclusion is significant in that it has provided the basis for a subsequent effort by Hyde (1994) to defend the legitimacy of supposing higher-order vagueness. Varzi's contribution to this debate is twofold. First, contra earlier criticism by Deas (1989), he claims that Sorensen's result is sound so far as it goes. Second, he argues that despite this it cannot be used as Hyde wishes on pain of circularity. I am not interested in the latter argument—it is examined in Hyde (2003)—but rather wish to defend and elaborate Deas's criticism of Sorensen against Varzi's repudiation.
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzi689
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References found in this work BETA

Vagueness, Truth and Logic.Kit Fine - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.

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‘Vague’ at Higher Orders.Ivan Hu - 2017 - Mind 126 (504):1189-1216.

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