Contemporary discussions do not always clearly distinguish two different forms of vagueness. Sometimes focus is on the imprecision of predicates, and sometimes the indefiniteness of statements. The two are intimately related, of course. A predicate is imprecise if there are instances to which it neither definitely applies nor definitely does not apply, instances of which it is neither definitely true nor definitely false. However, indefinite statements will occur in everyday discourse only if speakers in fact apply imprecise predicates to such indefinite instances. (What makes an instance indefinite is, it should be clear, predicate-relative.) The basic issue in the present inquiry is whether this indefiniteness ever really occurs; the basic question is, Why should it ever occur?
|Keywords||vagueness indefiniteness sorites paradox|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Gap Principles, Penumbral Consequence, and Infinitely Higher-Order Vagueness.Delia Graff Fara - 2003 - In J. C. Beall (ed.), New Essays on the Semantics of Paradox. Oxford University Press.
Vagueness, Logic and Use: Four Experimental Studies on Vagueness.Phil Serchuk, Ian Hargreaves & Richard Zach - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (5):540-573.
Ontic Vagueness and Metaphysical Indeterminacy.J. Robert G. Williams - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (4):763-788.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads144 ( #33,365 of 2,178,268 )
Recent downloads (6 months)19 ( #16,482 of 2,178,268 )
How can I increase my downloads?