Computational empiricism

Foundations of Science 1 (1):119-130 (1995)
Abstract
I argue here for a number of ways that modern computational science requires a change in the way we represent the relationship between theory and applications. It requires a switch away from logical reconstruction of theories in order to take surface mathematical syntax seriously. In addition, syntactically different versions of the same theory have important differences for applications, and this shows that the semantic account of theories is inappropriate for some purposes. I also argue against formalist approaches in the philosophy of science and for a greater role for perceptual knowledge rather than propositional knowledge in scientific empiricism.
Keywords Computational science  Theories  Models  Scientific instruments  Syntax  Semantics
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DOI 10.1007/BF00208728
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References found in this work BETA
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays.W. V. Quine - 1969 - Columbia University Press.
Ways of Worldmaking.Nelson Goodman - 1978 - Harvester Press.
Meaning and Necessity.Rudolf Carnap - 1947 - University of Chicago Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
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