Oxford University Press (2004)
| Authors |
|
| Abstract |
Computational methods have become the dominant technique in many areas of science. This book contains the first systematic philosophical account of these new methods and their consequences for scientific method. This book will be of interest to philosophers of science and to anyone interested in the role played by computers in modern science
|
| Keywords | Science |
| Categories | (categorize this paper) |
| Reprint years | 2007 |
| Buy this book | Amazon page |
| ISBN(s) | 0195158709 (cloth) 0195313291 0195158709 9780195313291 |
| Options |
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Request removal from index
|
Download options
PhilArchive copy
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy Papers currently archived: 71,379
External links
(no proxy) Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
- Sign in / register and customize your OpenURL resolver..
- Configure custom resolver
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
The Cognitive Neuroscience Revolution.Worth Boone & Gualtiero Piccinini - 2016 - Synthese 193 (5):1509-1534.
Robustness, Reliability, and Overdetermination (1981).William C. Wimsatt - 2012 - In Characterizing the Robustness of Science. pp. 61-78.
Understanding (with) Toy Models.Alexander Reutlinger, Dominik Hangleiter & Stephan Hartmann - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (4):1069-1099.
The Philosophical Novelty of Computer Simulation Methods.Paul Humphreys - 2009 - Synthese 169 (3):615 - 626.
Models, Measurement and Computer Simulation: The Changing Face of Experimentation.Margaret Morrison - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (1):33-57.
View all 216 citations / Add more citations
Similar books and articles
Paul Humphreys, Extending Ourselves: Computational Science, Empiricism, and Scientific Method, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.Johannes Lenhard - 2006 - Minds and Machines. Journal for Artificial Intelligence, Philosophy and Cognitive Science 16.
What’s Wrong With Aim-Oriented Empiricism?Nicholas Maxwell - 2015 - Acta Baltica Historiae Et Philosophiae Scientiarum 3 (2):5-31.
Review of Paul Humphreys, Extending Ourselves: Computational Science, Empiricism, and Scientific Method. [REVIEW]Paul Thagard - 2005 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (6).
Aim-Oriented Empiricism Since 1984.Nicholas Max - 2007 - In Nicholas Maxwell (ed.), From Knowledge to Wisdom: A Revolution for Science and the Humanities. Pentire Press.
“Do We Need a Scientific Revolution.Nicholas Maxwell - 2008 - Journal for Biological Physics and Chemistry 8 (3):95-105.
Induction and Scientific Realism: Einstein Versus Van Fraassen Part One: How to Solve the Problem of Induction.Nicholas Maxwell - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (1):61-79.
Models, Robustness, and Non-Causal Explanation: A Foray Into Cognitive Science and Biology.Elizabeth Irvine - 2015 - Synthese 192 (12):3943-3959.
Aim-Oriented Empiricism Since 1984.Nicholas Maxwell - 2007 - In From Knowledge to Wisdom: A Revolution for Science and the Humanities. Pentire Press.
Defending Science - Within Reason.Susan Haack - 1999 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 3 (2):187-212.
“Empiricism All the Way Down”: A Defense of the Value-Neutrality of Science in Response to Helen Longino's Contextual Empiricism.Stéphanie Ruphy - 2006 - Perspectives on Science 14 (2):189-214.
Computational Models in the Philosophy of Science.Paul Thagard - 1986 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:329 - 335.
The Rationality of Scientific Discovery Part II: An Aim Oriented Theory of Scientific Discovery.Nicholas Maxwell - 1974 - Philosophy of Science 41 (3):247-295.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2015-02-03
Total views
28 ( #410,740 of 2,519,650 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #71,990 of 2,519,650 )
2015-02-03
Total views
28 ( #410,740 of 2,519,650 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #71,990 of 2,519,650 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads
