Paul Humphreys
University of Virginia
Four interpretations of single-case conditional propensities are described and it is shown that for each a version of what has been called ‘Humphreys' Paradox’ remains, despite the clarifying work of Gillies, McCurdy and Miller. This entails that propensities cannot be a satisfactory interpretation of standard probability theory. Introduction The basic issue The formal paradox Values of conditional propensities Interpretations of propensities McCurdy's response Miller's response Other possibilities 8.1 Temporal evolution 8.2 Renormalization 8.3 Causal influence Propensities to generate frequencies Conclusion.
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/55.4.667
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References found in this work BETA

Why Propensities Cannot Be Probabilities.Paul Humphreys - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (4):557-570.
Varieties of Propensity.Donald Gillies - 2000 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4):807-835.
Critical Rationalism: A Restatement and Defence.David Miller - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (188):400-404.
Critical Rationalism. A Restatement and Defence.David Miller - 1995 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 185 (3):368-371.

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Citations of this work BETA

Conditional Probabilities.Kenny Easwaran - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 131-198.
Probability in GRW Theory.Roman Frigg & Carl Hoefer - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 (2):371-389.
An Objective Counterfactual Theory of Information.Jonathan Cohen & Aaron Meskin - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):333 – 352.
The Chances of Propensities.Mauricio Suárez - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (4):1155-1177.

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