Acta Analytica 22 (1):3-15 (2007)

Abstract
The most serious challenge to Frankfurt-type counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) comes in the form of a dilemma: either the counterexample presupposes determinism, in which case it begs the question; or it does not presuppose determinism, in which case it fails to deliver on its promise to eliminate all alternatives that might plausibly be thought to satisfy PAP. I respond to this challenge with a counterexample in which considering an alternative course of action is a necessary condition for deciding to act otherwise, and the agent does not in fact consider the alternative. I call this a “buffer case,” because the morally relevant alternative is “buffered” by the requirement that the agent first consider the alternative. Suppose further that the agent’s considering an alternative action—entering the buffer zone—is what would trigger the counterfactual intervener. Then it would appear that PAP-relevant alternatives are out of reach. I defend this counterexample to PAP against three objections: that considering an alternative is itself a morally relevant alternative; that buffer cases can be shown to contain other alternatives that arguably satisfy PAP; and that even if the agent’s present access to PAP-relevant alternatives were eliminated, PAP could still be satisfied in virtue of earlier alternatives. I conclude that alternative possibilities are a normal symptom, but not an essential constituent, of moral agency.
Keywords alternatives, buffer (buffer case, buffer strategy)  decision  free will  libertarian  moral responsibility  Principle of Alternate Possibilities
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Reprint years 2008
DOI 10.1007/BF02866207
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References found in this work BETA

Living Without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.
Moral Responsibility and Buffered Alternatives.David P. Hunt - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):126–145.
Living Without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):308-310.

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Excuses and Alternatives.Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):1-16.

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