Directives for Knowledge and Belief

In Daniel Whiting, Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford: (2018)

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David Hunter
Ryerson University
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Citations of this work BETA

Inference as a Mental Act.David Hunter - forthcoming - In Michael Brent (ed.), Mental Action.
Do Epistemic Reasons Bear on the Ought Simpliciter?Susanne Mantel - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):214-227.
Practical Reasoning and the First Person.David Hunter - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (2):677-700.

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