Philosophical Studies 164 (3):599-622 (2013)

Authors
Seth Shabo
University of Delaware
Abstract
Frankfurt cases are purported counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, which implies that we are not morally responsible for unavoidable actions. A major permutation of the counterexample strategy features buffered alternatives; this permutation is designed to overcome an influential defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Here we defend the buffering strategy against two recent objections, both of which stress the timing of an agent’s decision. We argue that attributions of moral responsibility aren’t time-sensitive in the way the objectors suppose. We then turn to the crucial question of when an action is relevantly avoidable—when, in the parlance of the literature, an alternative possibility is robust. We call attention to two plausible tests for robustness that merit further consideration, showing that the agents in buffered Frankfurt cases don’t pass these tests, despite being morally responsible for their actions
Keywords Frankfurt cases  Buffered alternatives  Franklin  Palmer  Hunt  Pereboom
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9874-y
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 64,159
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - Oxford University Press USA.
Living Without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.

View all 36 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Alternate Possibilities and Moral Asymmetry.Daniel Coren - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (2):145-159.
When is an Alternative Possibility Robust?Simon Kittle - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):199-210.
Pereboom’s Frankfurt Case and Derivative Culpability.Nadine Elzein - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):553-573.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Actions, Thought-Experiments and the 'Principle of Alternate Possibilities'.Maria Alvarez - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):61 – 81.
The Frankfurt Cases: The Moral of the Stories.John Martin Fischer - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (3):315-336.
Robust Alternatives and Responsibility.Robert Allen - 2004 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 1 (1):21-29.
Black the Libertarian.David P. Hunt - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (1):3-15.
Causal History Matters, but Not for Individuation.Kevin Timpe - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):77-91.
Pereboom on the Frankfurt Cases.David Palmer - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):261 - 272.
The Principle of Avoidable Blame.Gerald K. Harrison - 2004 - [email protected] - An International Journal for Moral Philosophy 3 (1):37-46.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-03-02

Total views
149 ( #72,328 of 2,454,830 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #98,232 of 2,454,830 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes