Frankfurt cases and the (in)significance of timing: a defense of the buffering strategy

Philosophical Studies 164 (3):599-622 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Frankfurt cases are purported counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, which implies that we are not morally responsible for unavoidable actions. A major permutation of the counterexample strategy features buffered alternatives; this permutation is designed to overcome an influential defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Here we defend the buffering strategy against two recent objections, both of which stress the timing of an agent’s decision. We argue that attributions of moral responsibility aren’t time-sensitive in the way the objectors suppose. We then turn to the crucial question of when an action is relevantly avoidable—when, in the parlance of the literature, an alternative possibility is robust. We call attention to two plausible tests for robustness that merit further consideration, showing that the agents in buffered Frankfurt cases don’t pass these tests, despite being morally responsible for their actions

Other Versions

No versions found

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-03-02

Downloads
432 (#56,967)

6 months
120 (#42,007)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Seth Shabo
University of Delaware
David P. Hunt
Whittier College

Citations of this work

Foreknowledge requires determinism.Patrick Todd - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 107 (1):125-146.
When is an alternative possibility robust?Simon Kittle - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):199-210.
Against (modified) buffer cases.Justin A. Capes - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (3):711-723.
Pereboom’s Frankfurt case and derivative culpability.Nadine Elzein - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):553-573.

View all 13 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.
The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
Living Without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Living without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):308-310.

View all 37 references / Add more references