Inference as a Mental Act

In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental actions. New York: Oxford University Press (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I will argue that a person is causally responsible for believing what she does. Through inference, she can sustain and change her perspective on the world. When she draws an inference, she causes herself to keep or to change her take on things. In a literal sense, she makes up her own mind as to how things are. And, I will suggest, she can do this voluntarily. It is in part because she is causally responsible for believing what she does that there are things that she ought to believe, and that what she believes can be to her credit or discredit. I won’t pursue these ethical matters here, but will focus instead on the metaphysics that underpin them.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Mental causation: Compulsion by reason.Bill Brewer - 1995 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 69:237-253.
How you know you are not a brain in a vat.Alexander Jackson - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2799-2822.
Cognitive dynamics: An attempt at changing your mind.Christoph Hoerl - 1996 - In Jerome Dokic (ed.), European Review of Philosophy, 2: Cognitive Dynamics. Center for the Study of Language and Inf. pp. 141-158.
How to be morally responsible for another's free intentional action.Olle Blomberg - 2023 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 25 (3):545-579.
Veronica's Trip to the Dentist.James Rocha & Mona Rocha - 2014 - In George Dunn & James South (eds.), Veronica Mars and Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 123–135.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-05-03

Downloads
476 (#60,461)

6 months
100 (#60,413)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

David Hunter
Toronto Metropolitan University

Citations of this work

Mental action.Antonia Peacocke - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (6):e12741.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Rationality Through Reasoning.John Broome (ed.) - 2013 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1 (4):328-332.
What is inference?Paul Boghossian - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):1-18.
Action, Knowledge, and Will.John Hyman - 2015 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

View all 38 references / Add more references