Is thinking an action?

I argue that entertaining a proposition is not an action. Such events do not have intentional explanations and cannot be evaluated as rational or not. In these respects they contrast with assertions and compare well with perceptual events. One can control what one thinks by doing something, most familiarly by reciting a sentence. But even then the event of entertaining the proposition is not an action, though it is an event one has caused to happen, much as one might cause oneself to see a book by looking at it. I also discuss how this may support the view that thinking about the world is a source of information about it
Keywords Action  Cognitive Science  Metaphysics  Perception  Speech  Thinking
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1024883526865
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Thoughts, Processive Character and the Stream of Consciousness.Marta Jorba - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (5):730-753.
Obsessive Thoughts and Inner Voices.Lucy O'Brien - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):93-108.

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